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Abstract
Secret sharing in user hierarchy represents a challenging area for
research. Although a lot of work has already been done in this direc-
tion, this paper presents a novel approach to share a secret among a
hierarchy of users while overcoming the limitations of the already exist-
ing mechanisms. Our work is based on traditional (k+ 1, n)-threshold
secret sharing, which is secure as long as an adversary can compromise
not more than k secret shares. But in real life it is often feasible for
an adversary to obtain more than k shares over a long period of time.
So, in our work we also present a way to overcome this vulnerability,
while implementing our hierarchical secret sharing scheme. The use of
Elliptic Curve Cryptography makes the computations easier and faster
in our work.
Keywords. Threshold secret sharing, User hierarchy, Proactive se-
cret sharing, Elliptic curve cryptography.
1 Introduction
The need to maintain the confidentiality of any data within an organization
as well as to prevent it from becoming corrupted or inaccessible due to single
point failure, has grown considerably, with rapid increase in computer crime.
To provide a solution to this, a lot of research work has already been done
to share a secret among a group of users. Parallel to this, many present day
applications arrange such groups of users into a hierarchy. For example, in
a banking system, the employees are arranged into a hierarchy according to
their ranks or designations. In this paper we propose a scheme to share a
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secret among all the users forming such a hierarchy. Our scheme is based on
traditional (k+1, n)-threshold secret sharing (where a secret data is divided
into n shares and stored into n different locations).
An important observation regarding traditional (k+1, n)-threshold secret
sharing is that, it is secure as long as an adversary can compromise not more
than k secret shares, whereas in real life it is often feasible for a mobile
adversary to obtain more than k shares over entire lifetime of the scheme.
That is why proactive secret sharing scheme is developed which divides the
entire lifetime of the scheme into several time periods and in each time period
the shares held by each user is renewed. So, the secret shares obtained from
various locations by the adversary in one time period are rendered useless in
the next time period. In this paper we show how a secret can be proactively
shared into a hierarchy. That is, we add to our hierarchical secret sharing
scheme, features, which renew the secret shares held by the members of the
hierarchy periodically.
Before proceeding further, we shall explain the aim of this paper clearly.
To do so we need to describe and to analyze two well known hierarchical
secret sharing schemes, which is done below.
Shamir’s Hierarchical Secret Sharing Shamir [1] in his hierarchical
secret sharing scheme proposed to assign larger number of shares to users
at higher levels of the hierarchy so that higher level users hold larger shares
of the secret and lower level users hold smaller shares. This leads to the
fact that to reconstruct the secret in Shamir’s scheme, the number of lower
level users required is greater than number of higher level users. As a result
there remains no distinction among the secrets held by the users at different
levels (i.e. a number of lower level users are equivalent to one higher level
user). At the same time the higher level users face storage problem since
they need to store a large number of secret shares in this scheme.
Tassa’s Hierarchical Secret Sharing Tassa [2] introduced the concept of
qualitative distinction among the users in their hierarchical secret sharing
scheme, by the usage of polynomial derivatives, to generate lesser shares for
lower level users instead of representing the secret as the free co-efficient
of a polynomial as in Shamir’s scheme. The secret is reconstructed in this
scheme by applying Birkhoff interpolation. Tassa’s scheme suffers the lim-
itation that use of a large finite field is necessary since the size of the base
field gets reduced each time a new level is added to the hierarchy and the
polynomial is differentiated.
Our goal in this paper is threefold. (1) To propose an efficient hierarchi-
cal secret sharing scheme which eliminates the storage problem of Shamir’s
hierarchical secret sharing scheme. (2) To ensure that the proposed scheme
does not reduce the size of the base field, as we go down to the lower lev-
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els of the hierarchy, while sharing a secret, thus eliminating the limitation
of Tassa’s scheme. (3) To propose a proactive share renewal mechanism
that can be applied to our hierarchical secret sharing scheme which makes it
secure in an environment, where a mobile adversary may be present through-
out the entire lifetime of the scheme.
1.1 The Hierarchical Model
To implement secret sharing into a hierarchy, we partition a given hierarchy
into some levels, such that the more powerful members form the higher levels
and less powerful ones form the lower levels of the hierarchy. We refer to
the power possessed by the members, in the context of what fraction of the
secret is held by each of them. More powerful members, comprising the
higher levels of the hierarchy hold larger fractions of the secret, while the
less powerful members, comprising the lower levels hold smaller fractions.
We refer to the above mentioned hierarchy, more appropriately, as a tree
throughout this paper.
 
ROOT 
U1 
level 0 
level 3 
level 2 
level 1 
U6 U5 U4 
U2 U3 
U9 U8 U7 U10 
U14 U13 U12 U11
Figure 1: User Hierarchy.
The idea of hierarchical arrangement of users is made clear by figure
1. The figure shows that the users are arranged into a hierarchical tree
(according to their positions in an organization). The tree is divided into
a number of levels. There is a trusted entity or a server forming the root
of the tree. The root server is responsible for secret sharing, delegation and
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reconstruction. All the users or members of the hierarchy are arranged into
the lower levels.
In our scheme, the secret is divided into several pieces and those pieces
are distributed among all the users forming the hierarchy in such a way that
with each increasing level, the amount of information about the secret, con-
tained in the delegated share, decreases. We have introduced the concept
of threshold factor and split operation in this paper, and have used elliptic
curve cryptography in order to make the computations faster and easier.
Security of our work depends on the difficulty of solving ECDLP (Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem).
Organisation of the paper. Section 2 presents a review of related re-
search works. Our hierarchical secret sharing scheme has been presented
in details in section 3. In section 3.6 an analysis is made, on how far the
proposed hierarchical secret sharing scheme has succeeded, to overcome the
limitations of the existing schemes. The proactive share renewal mechanism
in a hierarchy has been described in section 4. Section 4.1 gives a security
model for the proactive share renewal, section 4.3 presents a share renewal
protocol and section 4.4 presents a protocol to detect a compromised node.
We analyze the efficiency and performance of the proposed protocols as well
as compare our work with existing schemes in chapter 5. Finally we conclude
the paper in section 6.
2 Review of Literature
In this chapter we first present the traditional threshold secret sharing
scheme proposed by Shamir [1]. Having discussed the traditional thresh-
old secret sharing scheme, we describe hierarchical threshold secret sharing
schemes of Shamir [1] and Tassa [2], along with some other remarkable re-
search works on hierarchical access structures and access rights. Finally we
present some well known proactive secret sharing schemes.
2.1 Traditional Threshold Secret Sharing
In the original paper by Shamir [1], an elegant way to share a secret data D
into a group of n users has been showed. The secret data D is shared among
n users in such a way that it can be reconstructed easily from any (k + 1)
or more shares. But the knowledge of k or less shares gives no information
about D. This secret sharing scheme is called the (k+ 1,n) threshold secret
sharing scheme, where n is the number of users among whom the secret is
shared and (k + 1) is the threshold, i.e. the least number of usersrequired
to reconstruct the secret.
Thus, the (k + 1,n) threshold secret sharing scheme was originally pro-
posed by Shamir in 1979. In his paper, Shamir [1] stated the goal of a
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(k + 1, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme to be:
Dividing a secret data D into n pieces in such a way that:
1. knowledge of any k+ 1 or more Di pieces makes D easily computable;
2. knowledge of any k or fewer Di pieces leaves D completely undeter-
mined (in the sense that all its possible values are equally likely).
To each of the n users, one point in a two-dimensional plane is allocated,
represented as, (x1, y1),...,(xn, yn). Each xi is distinct and yi = q(xi) for
all i where q(xi) is a random k degree polynomial of the form q(xi) =
a0 + a1xi + ...akxki in which a0 = D and a1...ak are random integers. The
secret share for ith user is computed as Di = q(xi). Knowledge of any
k + 1 of those shares, is sufficient to find a0...ak by interpolation, where a0
represents the original secret.
By Shamir’s [1] scheme, if a secret is shared among a group of users,
not all of the users are required to co-operate, which ensures convenience of
use. On the other hand, if a number of users less than a threshold (k + 1
here), co-operate, they can never reconstruct the secret, at least a number
of users, greater than the threshold, is required for the same. This ensures
reliability of the scheme.
2.2 Hierarchical Secret Sharing Schemes
2.2.1 Adi Shamir [1]
Shamir proposed a way to apply his (k + 1,n) threshold secret sharing
scheme [1] to a hierarchical structure. To do so, he proposed to grant larger
number of secret shares to more powerful users (forming the higher levels of
hierarchy) while less powerful users, at the lower levels of the hierarchy are
granted lesser number of shares. This leads to the fact that lesser number of
higher level users are capable of reconstructing the secret whereas the same
action requires more number of lower level users.
We give an example to make the idea clear. Consider a hierarchy of 7
users, consisting of three levels 0, 1 and 2. Following Shamir’s hierarchical
secret sharing scheme, the user(s) at level 0 are given 3 shares each, users
at level 1 are given 2 shares each and users at level 2 are given 1 share
each. Now, consider a scenario of (3,n) threshold secret sharing applied to
this hierarchy. (Here n is 7 and k is 2.) From the working of Shamir’s
(k+1, n) threshold secret sharing scheme and from the share distribution in
the hierarchy, it is clear that to reconstruct the secret only 1 level 0 user is
sufficient, whereas it requires at least 2 users at level 1 and at least 3 users
at level 2.
Clearly, Shamir’s [1] hierarchical secret sharing scheme suffers from stor-
age problem since the higher level users have to store larger number of
shares.
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2.2.2 Tamir Tassa [2]
In 2007, Tamir Tassa [2] introduced the concept of distinguishing the hierar-
chical levels qualitatively, i.e. the secret share of a higher level user contains
more information about the original secret than that of a lower level user.
Thus he solved the problem of large storage requirement faced by Shamir’s
hierarchical secret sharing scheme. Tassa [2] used derivatives of polynomials
instead of using free coefficients of polynomials to represent the secret.
With each lowering level in the hierarchy, we find that the size of the
base field gets reduced by this scheme, although it solves the storage problem
faced by Shamir’s [1] scheme. To reconstruct the secret, Birkhoff interpola-
tion is used in Tassa’s [2] scheme which is applicable to a set of polynomial
derivatives.
In addition to this, a lot of research work have been done on access
structures and access rights in user hierarchy. Among the notable ones, is
a delegation mechanism, proposed in 1997 by Chris Charnes et. al. [14],
where a higher level user in a hierarchy can delegate his power to retrieve
a secret, to some lower level user. The above mentioned paper deals with
access structure in a hierarchy and authorized subset of users. In 2004
Chang et. al. dealt with access structure in user hierarchy and delegation of
access rights in [15], where each access structure has its own secret key and
one class of user can delegate its access right to another class by granting
admission ticket to it.
2.3 Proactive Secret Sharing
Traditional (k+ 1,n) secret sharing schemes share a secret among n users in
such a way that any k + 1 of themcan reconstruct the secret, but k or less
shares are incapable to do the same. This assumes that an adversary can
never gain more than k shares. But in an environment where an adversary
is mobile and can compromise more than k users, such schemes fail. So,
proactive secret sharing schemes first share a secret among the users, using
a traditional secret sharing scheme, and then divide the entire lifetime of the
scheme into a number of time periods (a day, a week, or a month) in such
a way, that no adversary can gain more than k shares during a single time
period. During each period, the shares of the users are renewed, so that the
shares obtained by an adversary during one time period are rendered useless
from the next time period.
2.3.1 Otrovsky and Yung [5]
In order to keep servers free from mobile adversaries such as network viruses
or worms, Otrovsky and Yung [5], in 1991, proposed the first proactive secret
sharing scheme, where old shares are discarded and new shares are generated
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periodically and a server, compromised by an adversary, is rebooted to get
rid of the adversary.
2.3.2 Herzberg et. al. [3]
In 1995, Herzberg et. al. [3] proposed a proactive secret sharing scheme
which renews the shares of all users forming a group periodically, so that,
any share compromised by an adversary during one time period, becomes
useless from the next. In Herzberg et. al.’s [3] scheme, initially all the users
obtain their secret shares by any traditional threshold secret sharing. To
renew a secret share, Herzberg et. al. [3] proposed to add to the share, a
set of polynomials, having their free co-efficients equal to 0 (i.e. δ(0) = 0
where p is the polynomial). Each such polynomial is sent to any user, by
one of the other users. That is, in time period t + 1, user Ui renews his
share q(t)(i) to q(t+1)(i) by computing q(t+1)(i) = q(t)(i) +
∑n
k=1δk(i), ∀
k such that Uk belongs to the group (of n users) and where δk(i) is the
polynomial contributed by user Uk. Thus, Herzberg et. al.’s [3] scheme
depends on all users in a group to renew the share of any one user. To find
out whether any adversary is present within the group, or any node has
become compromised, the proposed scheme uses a verification mechanism
which depends on Discrete Logarithm Problem.
2.3.3 David A. Schultz [6]
Another remarkable research work in this direction is that of David Andrew
Schultz [6]. In 2007, Schultz [6], in his thesis on ”‘Mobile Proactive Secret
Sharing”’, proposed an extension of proactive secret sharing scheme, which
allows the group members participating in the scheme to change dynami-
cally from one time period to another. In addition to this, in Schultz’s [6]
scheme the threshold is also variable between different time periods. Thus
Schultz’s [6] mobile proactive secret sahring scheme is much more flexible
that the previous proactive secret sharing schemes.
3 Hierarchical Secret Sharing
In this section we describe in details, the proposed way of sharing a secret
into a hierarchy. Before moving into the details it is important to mention
clearly all the assumptions we have made in this scheme, which are:
1. Each user or member of the hierarchy, knows his position in the hi-
erarchy, i.e. who is his immediate predecessor and who all are his
immediate successors in the tree.
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2. The presence of a trusted entity in the organization, which we refer to
as the root server.
3. To participate in the proposed hierarchical secret sharing scheme, each
user has to register himself with the server, through which he is granted
a unique secret registration token which is known only to that user
and the server. A user obtains his registration token from the server
either over a secure channel (e.g. in person or by courier). Registration
is done only once by each user when he joins the group (of users forming
the hierarchy) for the first time.
3.1 Important Definitions and Notations
Our scheme is a threshold secret sharing scheme and we have introduced the
concept of threshold factor in this paper.
Definition 1. The threshold factor (TF ) is a positive integer whose range
is (0,1]. If a secret is shared among n number of users, the minimum number
of them required to co-operate for reconstructing the secret correctly, is the
ceiling of the product of TF and n. That is, in terms of (k, n) threshold
secret sharing,
threshold(k) = dTF . ne.
For example, if a secret is shared among 9 users and the TF is 0.3, then the
number of users (from those 9 users) required to reconstruct the secret will
be threshold(k) = d0.3 × 9e = 3.
Split operation is a basic operation used to implement the proposed
scheme. It is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Given a positive integer I, two random positive integers
I
′
and I
′′
are chosen such that I
′
+ I
′
= I. This is called the split operation.
Next we present some important notations:
E(Fp) - An elliptic curve modulo p on prime finite field Fp of size p, having
a base point G which is made available publicly to all users in the
hierarchy.
rtoki - Registration token of user Ui.
Obtained from the server by Ui very securely, preferably in person or
by courier, during registration while joining the group.
Kgi - Group key of user Ui.
Maintained and used as long as Ui is a member of the group.
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Kri - Round key of user Ui.
Maintained and used for one round of secret distribution and recon-
struction.
P rs - Server’s Public Round Key.
Maintained and used for one round of secret distribution and recon-
struction. Used by the group members to compute their round keys.
3.2 Joining the Hierarchy by a User
(a) Registration: When a new user wants to join an existing group of users
forming the hierarchy, he has to make a registration with the server. While
registration the user obtains a unique registration token from the server
(as described earlier), using which he computes his group key. Each user
maintains this registration token and the group key as long as he is a member
of the group. The server also stores the group key of each group member as
long as he is a member of the group.
An example will make the idea clear. Let Ui be a user who wants to join
an already existing group of users. Ui requests the server for registration.
On receiving this request, the server grants Ui a registration token rtoki,
which is stored by Ui as long as he is a member of the group. Registration
token of a user is unique (in the group) in the sense that, x-coordinates
of the points on E(Fp), representing the group keys of any two users, are
different. For example, if Kgi = (xi,yi) and K
g
j = (xj ,yj) then, xi 6= xj .
(b)Group key computation: Using rtoki, user Ui as well as the server com-
putes the group key Kgi of Ui as,
Kgi = rtoki . G
Ui stores rtoki and K
g
i , and the server stores K
g
i as long as Ui is a
member of this group.
3.3 Secret Share Distribution
Here we will describe a single round of secret share distribution which can
be divided into 2 broad steps:
1. Round key computations.
2. Share computation and delegation.
3.3.1 Round Key Computations
After the initial steps are over, the server starts the rounds of secret sharing
and reconstruction. For each round r of secret share distribution, the server
broadcasts its public round key P rs into the hierarchy.
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P rs = ss.G
where ss is a secret integer selected randomly by the server.
The server’s public round key is used by each user Ui to compute his
own round key Kri , for that round r as
Kri = rtoki.P
r
s = (Xi.Yi).
Simultaneously the server can compute the round key of each user Ui using
the secret ss and Ui’s group key K
g
i as
Kri = ss.K
g
i = (Xi.Yi).
3.3.2 Share Computation and Delegation
Now the server starts receiving request messages from the users for secret
shares distribution. The request message (ReqMi) of user Ui consists of three
pieces of information viz. [i, parenti, numberOfChildreni], representing
the id of the user (Ui) itself, id of its immediate predecessor or parent, and
number of its immediate successors or children respectively, in the hierarchy.
The server computes and delegates the shares into the highest level (level
1 ) first, followed by level 2 and so on, upto the lowest level of the hierarchy.
The procedure for share computation and delegation is presented next
in form of an algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Procedure for share computation and delegation
1: The server computes thresholdroot = dTF .(number of level 1 users)e,
and selects a random (thresholdroot − 1)-degree polynomial qroot such
that its free coefficient qroot(0) = D, the original secret data to be shared.
2: for (each user Ui) do
3: The server receives ReqMi from Ui.
4: if (numberOfChildreni == 0) then
5: The server computes secret share of Ui as Di = qparenti(i).
6: else
7: The server computes qparenti(i) and splits it into two parts Di and
D
′
i using split operation. Di represents the secret share of Ui and
D
′
i is stored at the server (to be used later, while computing secret
shares of Ui’s children).
8: The server computes thresholdi = dTF . numberOfChildrenie
and selects a random (thresholdi − 1)-degree polynomial qi, whose
free coefficient qi(0) = D
′
parenti .
9: end if
10: The server sends Di to Ui over a secure channel (for example , by
encrypting with Ui’s public key) so that it can be decrypted correctly
only by Ui.
11: end for
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3.4 Secret Reconstruction
As described in the previous section 3.3.2, the secret share of a user is split
into two parts, one of which is held by the user and the other is distributed
among its children. Using this concept, secret reconstruction starts from
the lowest level and goes up to the higher levels until the root is reached.
(Highest level corresponds to level 0; any level i+1 is lower than level i).
Each user (except any lowest level user) reconstructs its own secret share
with the help of its children and sends it to its parent.
The following 3 steps present the whole reconstruction procedure.
1. All children of Ui, co-operate to reconstruct the information D
′
i and
send it to Ui, again over a secure channel.
2. Ui adds D
′
i with Di to produce qparenti(i), and follows the same step
1 to reconstruct D
′
parenti (with the co-operation of its sibling nodes).
3. Steps 1-2 are repeated for nodes at each level, starting from the lowest,
moving gradually up to the highest level, when, finally the original
secret D is reconstructed at the root server.
3.5 Leaving the Hierarchy by a User
When a group member wants to leave the hierarchy, he broadcasts a leave
message. This message implies that no user in the subtree rooted at the
leaving member can participate in secret sharing any more. As soon as
this message is received at the server, the server drops the group key of
the leaving member. For example, consider the hierarchy shown in figure 2.
When U2 leaves the group, none of the users U7 - U14 (shown by the shaded
circles) can participate in secret sharing, since they form the subtree rooted
at U1.
All the users in the hierarchy forming the subtree which was rooted at the
leaving member can again participate in secret distribution and reconstruc-
tion only after someone joins the hierarchy replacing the leaving member, in
other words, when some other user joins the hierarchy in the position that
was enjoyed previously by the member who has left.
3.6 Our achievements till now
Here we shall try to find out, how far we have succeeded till now, to achieve
the goals we had set at the beginning of this paper.
• In our scheme, each user has to store only one secret share, eliminating
the storage problem of Shamir’s hierarchical secret sharing scheme.
• None of the operations reduces the size of the finite field. In fact, the
size of the finite field remains the same, as the one used in general
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U1 
U6 U5 U4 
U2 U3 
U9 U8 U7 U10 
U14 U13 U12 U11
Figure 2: Leave Operation.
secret sharing schemes without any hierarchy. Thus we have overcome
the limitation of Tassa’s scheme.
So our first two goals have been achieved, by the proposed scheme. Our
next concern is the fact, that the security of traditional (k+ 1, n)-threshold
secret sharing depends on the assumption that at no instance of time, more
than k shares can be gained by an adversary. This, in many cases proves
to be a weak assumption. Next we elaborate on this threat and present a
proactive share renewal mechanism to do away with concerned vulnerability.
4 Proactive Renewal of Secret Shares in a Hierar-
chy
Our next concern is the fact, that the security of traditional (k + 1, n)-
threshold secret sharing depends on the assumption that at no instance of
time, more than k shares can be gained by an adversary. This, in many
cases proves to be a weak assumption. In this section we elaborate on this
threat and present a proactive share renewal mechanism to do away with
concerned vulnerability.
4.1 Security Model
We consider the case, where the entire lifetime of a (k+1, n)-threshold secret
sharing scheme, spans a long period of time. In other words, a secret having
been shared into a network or group, remains so for a long time period,
which may even be a few years. Under such circumstances if an adversary
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is mobile, i.e. it can hop from one host to another within the network, and
its speed is such that it can cover more than k hosts within a lifetime of the
secret sharing scheme, the adversary achieves more than k shares and secret
is revealed to the adversary. Thus, we can state that, when an adversary
compromises a node of the hierarchy, his aim is to gain the secret share
of that node, and over the entire lifetime of the (k + 1, n)−secret sharing
scheme, the aim of the adversary is to gain more than k secret shares.
If the network is huge, it may infeasible for one adversary to cover more
than k hosts within one lifetime of the secret sharing scheme. But here we
deal with a hierarchy which exists within an organization and in most cases
such a hierarchy consists of a rather small number of users and we use a
(k + 1, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme. So, it is necessary to provide
mechanisms so that even a fast mobile adversary cannot achieve more than
k shares, however long the lifetime of the scheme be.
So we propose a mechanism to renew the shares within a hierarchy. The
proposed mechanism depends on the research work done by Herzberg et.
al.[3] on proactive secret sharing. We propose to divide the entire lifetime
of the the hierarchical secret sharing scheme into a number of small time
periods (so called proactive), which may be one day or one week, depending
on the speed of the adversary. Secret shares are renewed during each time
period.
Even though the proposed proactive share renewal scheme prevents an
adversary to compromise more than k users, but the adversary can always
compromise k or lesser users, in a single time period. In this paper we pro-
pose a mechanism, using elliptic curve cryptography, to detect such com-
promised users within the hierarchy. But, what does the system do after it
has detected a user to be compromised? Here our first assumption comes
into play.
Assumption 1. When the scheme detects the system of a user to have
been compromised by an adversary during a time period, the user sends
an alert message to the system administrator who takes necessary measures
(such as reboot or running an anti-virus program) so that the user gets rid
of the adversary within that time period.
4.2 Synchronization
For this scheme to work efficiently, it is necessary that all users of the scheme
renew their shares in each time period, without failure.
One way of achieving this is by synchronizing the local clocks of all users
with a common global clock. With each tick of the global clock, one time
period ends and another starts, alerting all users so that they start another
round of share renewal.
But complexities arise, in distributed environments, while trying to syn-
172
International Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology, Volume 2, Number 3, June 2010
chronize large number of users with a single clock since it is very difficult
to maintain a single (global) clock, so that all nodes of the hierarchy are
synchronized with that clock.
To reduce such complexities, we restrict the notion of synchronization by
our second assumption, so that the need to maintain a system-wide global
clock, is eliminated, but at the same time, the requirement of dividing the
lifetime of the secret sharing scheme into timeperiods as well as periodic
share renewal at each node is achieved.
Assumption 2. We assume that each node of the tree is synchronized
with its parent. Thus, it is sufficient to synchronize all other nodes in a
2-leveled subtree (a m-leveled tree is a tree consisting of exactly m levels),
with the root of the subtree, thereby eliminating the need for synchronizing
all users in the hierarchy.
By saying, ’all other nodes in a 2-leveled subtree are synchronized with
the root of the subtree’, we mean, any message broadcasted, unicasted or
multicasted by the root, is received by the other node(s) or recipient(s)
within one time period, which is necessarily that time period, in which the
message was sent.
4.3 Share Renewal Protocol in a 2-leveled Subtree
The secret share held by a user Ui in a 2-leveled subtree, during a time
period t, is represented by q(i)t. Unique identity of user Ui is represented
by i here. The share renewal protocol is carried out in following 3 steps:
1. At the end of time period t the root Ui of the subtree selects a ran-
dom k-degree polynomial ∆t+1i where ∆
t+1
i (0)=0, i.e. ∆
t+1
i (x) =∑k
h=1 ∆
t+1
ih .x
h for any x. (Here we consider the case of a (k + 1, n)-
threshold secret sharing).
2. Ui sends ∆t+1i (j) to each of its children Uj over a secure channel. (For
example, by encrypting with Uj ’s public key. So it can be decrypted
by no one but Uj).
3. Each child Uj of root Ui renews his share q(j)t+1 = q(j)t+∆t+1i (j).
During each time period, each node verifies whether the ∆ value sent to it by
its parent is correct, in order to detect whether the parent is compromised
by an adversary. To facilitate this feature, we propose that each user carries
out a detection mechanism after step 1 of the share renewal scheme which
we describe next.
4.4 Detecting a Compromised Node
This section provides a mechanism to detect whether any node has been
compromised by adversary. This mechanism is carried out by the nodes in
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each time period. At the beginning of the detection scheme, the trusted root
server selects an elliptic curve E(Fp) on a finite field of order p and makes
a base point G on E(Fp) publicly available to all the users in the hierarchy.
1. In each time period the root Ui of each 2-leveled subtree, multicasts
the set {Θih for 1≤h≤k : Θih = ∆ih.G and ∆i(x) =
∑k
h=1 ∆ih.x
h} to
its children. (∆i0 or ∆i(0) is always 0.)
2. Each user Uj verifies whether the ∆ value sent by its parent Ui is
correct by evaluating the following equation:
∆i(j).G =
∑k
h=1 Θih.j
h.
3. If the equation holds then Uj decides that Ui is not compromised and
renews its share using ∆i(j).
4. If the equation does not hold Uj decides that Ui is compromised and
sends an alert to the system administrator claiming Ui is compromised.
When Uj claims Ui to be compromised, the probability for Ui to be ac-
tually compromised is the same as the probability of Uj being compromised,
since an adversary may always make a false claim. We propose to resolve
this issue in the following way.
4.4.1 Deciding on a Claim
In (k + 1, n)-threshold proactive secret sharing at most k locations can be
compromised by adversary, in one time period. Conversely, at least (n− k)
users can be trusted in one time period. Depending on those (n−k) trusted
nodes, decision is made in our scheme regarding whether it is the claimed
node or the claimer node which is compromised. If (n − k) or more claims
are made against a parent node by its children, then it is the claimed node
who is decided to be compromised. If, on the other hand, less than (n− k)
claims are made against a node, then all of the claimer nodes are decided
to be compromised.
Proposed way of finding the compromised node(s) in a claim uses the
fact that, the decision of all the non-compromised children of a node, is al-
ways the same, regarding whether their parent is compromised or not.
The proactive share renewal mechanism achieves our third goal, since,
now we can claim that even if a mobile adversary can obtain more than k
secret shares throughout the whole lifetime of the secret sharing scheme,
the number of these shares corresponding to a single time period is always
less than k. In the next section, we do a security analysis and show how
integrity, availability and confidentiality are maintained in our scheme.
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5 Analysis
In this section we will discuss our achievements, to see how far we have
succeeded in achieving our goals set at the beginning of this paper.
5.1 Analysis of Hierarchical Secret Sharing Scheme: A Com-
parison with Existing Schemes
The first goal set by us, was to propose a hierarchical secret sharing scheme
that will overcome the limitations of the two most well-known and exten-
sively used schemes proposed by Shamir [1] and Tassa [2]. In section ?? we
have proposed a scheme that shares a secret data into a hierarchy. Next we
shall try to find out how the proposed scheme overcomes the limitations of
Shamir’s [1] and Tassa’s [2] schemes.
• In our scheme, secret share of each parent node is split into two parts.
One of those represents the free co-efficient a polynomial used to com-
pute secret shares of its children. The share received by each child
node, is the value of the polynomial, computed using one part of the
parent’s share and the unique registration token of the child.
Thus each user has to store only one secret share, eliminating the
storage problem of Shamir’s [1] hierarchical secret sharing scheme.
• Moreover, the split operation does not reduce the size of the finite field,
when we go down to the lower layers of the hierarchy implementing
our scheme. In fact, the size of the finite field remains the same as
the one used in general secret sharing schemes without any hierarchy.
Thus we have overcome the limitation of Tassa’s [2] scheme.
5.2 Analysis of the Proactive Share Renewal Scheme
The major goal that we have tried to achieve in section ??, is to make our
hierarchical secret sharing scheme secure, in an environment where mobile
adversaries may be present. We have achieved the same by disallowing such
an adversary to acquire more than k shares, in a hierarchical (k + 1,n)-
threshold secret sharing environment.
Our scheme is based on the proactive secret sharing scheme of Herzberg
et. al. [3]. Our scheme has increased the applicability of the Herzberg
et. al.’s [3] scheme to a large hierarchy considerably. Our achievements in
comparison with Herzberg et. al.’s [3] work are presented in the next section.
5.2.1 Comparison with Herzberg et. al.’s [3] Proactive Secret
Sharing Scheme
Time Complexity Analysis
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The proactive share renewal mechanism of Herzberg et. al. [3] proposes
to renew the share of each user in a group, by adding to its own share,
a polynomial sent by each of the other users. The time complexity of
share renewal by each user in each time period is O(n), where n is the
number of users. Thus the time complexity of share renewal during
one time period is O(n2).
Our scheme proposes to renew the share of each user, by adding to it
a polynomial sent by its parent. All users do not need to contribute to
the share renewal of each of the other users, which makes our scheme
applicable to a hierarchy with various levels. Moreover the time com-
plexity of share renewal, during one time period, is reduced to O(n),
since each user, during a particular time period, requires Θ(1) time.
Detecting a Compromised Node
In section 4.4 we have used elliptic curve cryptography to detect a com-
promised node, which makes our scheme faster than that of Herzberg
et. al. [3].
Resolving Accusations
A significant part of any proactive secret sharing scheme is to detect
whether a node has been compromised by an adversary. And if one
node finds another one to be compromised, it accuses the later. But
since in such an environment both the accused node as well as the
accusing node may be compromised, it is necessary to decide on this
matter.
In Herzberg at. al.’s scheme [3], if a node Pi accuses node Pj , the
later one has to defend itself publicly by broadcasting some message(s),
thereby revealing some information (as described in 2.3). We solve the
accusation problem in our scheme in the following way (section ??):
If at least (n−k) out of n children of a node claim it to be compromised,
then the parent is compromised indeed. Otherwise it is the claiming
child node, which is compromised. Thus we do away with leakage of
information as well as the broadcasting requirement, thereby reducing
the bandwidth requirement.
5.2.2 Security Analysis
Integrity and Availability
The main objective of proactive secret sharing is to renew the share of
each user, in each time period, without modifying the original secret
that is shared. By our hierarchical secret sharing scheme, any secret
data that is shared among a group of users is represented by the free
coefficient of a polynomial (which is essentially a feature of traditional
176
International Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology, Volume 2, Number 3, June 2010
Shamir’s [1] secret sharing scheme). So, the integrity of this free co-
efficient needs to be maintained even though the polynomial or the
shares are renewed.
In our proactive share renewal scheme, we add a random polynomial
∆(i) to q(i), the secret share of user Ui, in order to renew the share.
Since ∆(0) is always chosen to be 0, q(0) always remains unaltered
after the addition operations, although all other coefficients of q(i) are
refreshed. Thus we renew the secret share q(i) without modifying the
original secret data q(0). The secret data can always be generated by
the reconstruction procedure described in section 3.4 and the recon-
struction always generates the same secret, in whichever time period
it is carried out.
Confidentiality
In the compromised node detection scheme, user Ui matches ∆i(j).G
value with
∑k
h=1 Θih.j
h, for 1≤h≤k, where Uj is the parent of Ui. We
claim that, if both Ui and Uj are non-compromised, then these two
values should match. The correctness of our claim is proved, since:
∆i(j).G
= (∆i1.j1 + ∆i2.j2 + ...+ ∆ik.jk).G [Note, ∆ik is always 0.]
= ∆i1.G.j1 + ∆i2.G.j2 + ...+ ∆ik.G.jk
= Θi1.j1 + Θi2.j2 + ...+ Θik.jk
=
∑k
h=1 Θih.j
h
Although the Θ values (which are obtained by elliptic curve point mul-
tiplication of ∆ values andG), are multicast into the 2-leveled subtrees,
the ∆ values can never be gained by an adversary due to the hardness
of Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Thus confidentiality of
the renewed shares is always maintained.
6 Conclusion
An efficient secret sharing scheme, suitable for a hierarchy of users has been
proposed in this paper. Elliptic curve cryptography has been used to gen-
erate the keys. Hence the keys are of smaller size and the computations are
faster and less complex. The scheme reduces the storage requirement of the
users and works without decreasing the size of finite field.
This paper also presents an efficient proactive share renewal mechanism,
which removes the vulnerabilities of the hierarchical secret sharing scheme,
due to the presence of a mobile adversary within a hierarchy of users. Since
the adversary is mobile it compromises some of the users. A protocol to
detect such compromised users has been presented, which is based on elliptic
curve cryptography. In our scheme we propose that the system administrator
takes the necessary steps after detecting any compromised node.
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